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FRANKS V. DELAWARE: A PROPOSED INTERPRETATION 
AND APPLICATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Franks v. 1Jelaware1 the United States Supreme Court extended 
the reach of the exclusionary rule2 to h_old that a criminal defendant 
may, under certain circumstances, challenge the· veracity of factual alle-
gations made in an affidavit supporting a search warrant. 3 Resolving 
an issue which had caused considerable conflict among the states4 and, 
to a lesser extent, among federal courts, 5 the Court emphasized the 
fourth amendment's guarantee that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation . " 6 The "Oath 
I. 438 u.s. 154 (1978). -
2. Applicable in both federal, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and state, Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), courts, the exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of evidence 
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. The exclusionary rationale has been extended to 
violations of the sixth amendment right to counsel in Massiah v. United States, 377 U .S. 201 
(1964) (confessions) and in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert v. ·Califomia, 
388 U.S. 263 (1967) (line up and subsequent in-court identificatiun). 
3. 438 U.S. at 156. 
4. Appendix B to the Franks opinion (438 U.S. 154, 176-80 app. (1978)) lists those states 
which permitted a veracity challenge prior to Franks; those which permitted veracity challenges as 
dictated by statute; those states whose position on the issue was doubtful, but seemed to allow 
veracity challenges; those states which have disposed of particular veracity challenges on the 
ground that the warrant affidavits were in fact not false, or that any misstatements were immate-
rial, unintentional or not made by the affiant himself; those states which flatly prohibited veracity 
challenges; and, finally, the two states (Missouri and Rhode Island) which prohibited challenges 
that were directed seemingly against the conclusory nature of the affidavits, ~ather than their ve-
racity. 
5. Prior to Franks, the United States circuit courts of appeals almost unanimously allowed 
a defendant to challenge the veracity of a warrant affidavit. See United States v. Armocida, 515 
F.2d 29 (3d Cir.), cerl. denied sub nom. Gazel v. United States, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States 
v. Lee, 540 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1975); United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 
4 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976); United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58 (1st 
Cir. 1974); United States v. Damitz, 495 F.2d 50 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Marihart, 492 
F.2d 897 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 827 (1974); United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983 
(7th Cir. 1973) (en bane); United States v. Thorn~. 489 F .2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 423 
U.S. 844 (1975); United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d 322 (lOth Cir. 1972); United States v. Dun-
nings, 425 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1969), cerl. denied, 397 U.S. 1002 (1970). Only the United States 
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia did not permit challenges to affiant veracity. 
See United States v. Branch, 545 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Watts, 540 F.Zd 1093 
(D.C. Cir. 1976). 
6. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Thus, a valid arrest warrant or search warrant may only issue upon an affidavit or complaint 
which sets forth facts establishing probable -cause. 
The function of the probable cause requirement in the search warrant context: 
is to guarantee a substantial probability that the invasions involved in the search will be 
justified by discovery of offending items. Two conclusions necessary to the issuance of the 
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or affirmation" requirement, reasoned the Franks Court, is intended to 
ensure the truthfulness of the allegations which comprise the assertion 
of probable cause. 7 
After discussing the Franks opinion and conflicting pre-Franks 
case law, this comment evaluates the standards established by the 
Franks Court to be applied by lower courts in ruling on a defendant's 
request for a veracity hearing. The comment proposes a practical ap-
plication of the Franks standard which allows the defendant to chal-
lenge suspect affidavits without delaying the judicial process and 
harassing the police with frivolous claims of falsification. The com-
ment then explores the parameters of a question expressly left un-
resolved by the Franks opinion: whether, and what circumstances, a 
reviewing court must require the revelation of an informant's identity 
once the defendant has shown the need for a veracity hearing.8 Finally, 
the comment reviews the pertinent considerations and proposes a 
method for accommodating the conflicting interests between protecting 
the secrecy of the informant's identity and exposing affiant falsifica-
tion.9 
II. BALANCING SOCIETAL COSTS 
A. The Facts of Franks v. Delaware 
Jerome Franks was convicted of rape, kidnapping and burglary 
after Mrs. Cynthia Bailey told police that a man with a knife had sexu--
ally assaulted her in her home. She described the rapist's physical 
characteristics and stated that he was wearing a white thermal under-
warrant must be supported by substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact seizable 
by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the 
place to be searched . . . . (T]he right of arrest arises only when a crime is committed or 
attempted in the presence of the arresting officer or when the officer has "reasonable grounds 
to believe"-sometimes stated "probable cause to believe"~at a felony has been commit· 
ted by the person to be arrested. 
Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on The Fourth Amendment, 28 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 664, 687 (1961). 
The Supreme Court has offered this formulation of probable cause: "(p]robable cause exists 
if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the 
offense has been committed." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959). See GiordeneUo v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 592 (1948); 
Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 (1923); Stacy v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1978). 
7. 438 U.S. at 164. 
8. /d. at 170. 
9. This comment does not consider the difficult issue of whether a veracity hearing ought as 
a matter of fourth amendment policy to be required whenever a warrant affidavit contains a delib-
erate falsehood even if probable cause would still exist once the false statement is excised from the 
warrant, and the falsity is not material to the probable cause assertion. On that issue compare 
United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976); United States 
v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973); State v. Boyd, 224 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974); and State 
v. Goodlow, 11 Wash. App. 533, 523 P.2d 1024 (1974) with State v. Payne, 25 Ariz. App. 454, 544 
P.2d 671 (1976); Lockridge v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. App. 2d 612, 80 Cal. Rptr. 223 (1969) and 
People v. Staffney, 70 Mich. App. 737, 246 N.W.2d 364 (1976). See generally Kipperman, Jnaccu-
-,.ate Search Warrant Affidavits as a Ground for Suppressing Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REv. 825 (1971). 
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shirt, black pants with a silver or gold buckle, a brown leather coat, and 
a dark knit cap. Coincidentally, on the day Mrs. Bailey reported the 
rape, police took defendant Franks into custody for assaulting a fifteen 
year old girl. While awaiting his bail hearing, the defendant told the 
youth officer accompanying him that he was surprised that the bail 
hearing was about the fifteen year old girl. The defendant remarked "I 
thought you said Bailey. I don't know her." 10 
The next day the youth officer mentioned the defendant's com-
ments to the detective working on the Bailey case. The detective sub-
mitted a sworn affidavit 11 to the justice of the peace in support of a 
warrant to search the defendant's apartment. The warrant affidavit de-
scribed the police's desire to confirm that the defendant's mode of dress 
matched that of the person who attacked Mrs. Bailey. In addition, the 
affidavit asserted that the affiant had spoken to James Morrison and 
Wesley Lucas, fellow employees of the defendant. As alleged in the 
affidavit, these men had described the defendant's normal dress as con-
sisting of a white thermal undershirt, a brown leather jacket, and a knit 
hat. Acting upon the warrant, police found a white thermal undershirt, 
a knit hat, dark pants, a leather jacket, and a single bladed knife in the 
defendant's apartment. At trial, the state offered those items into evi-
dence. 
At the suppression hearing defendant's counsel had asserted that 
Lucas and Morrison would testify that the warrant affiant had not in-
terviewed them. In addition, the defense counsel argued, although 
Frank's fellow employees had spoken to a police officer, the informa-
tion they had given him was "somewhat different" from that reported 
in the affidavit. Defendant's counsel asserted that the affiant had pur-
posely and in "bad faith" included the misrepresentations in his war-
rant affidavit. 12 Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied, 13 and 
he lost his appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. 14 
In reversing Franks's conviction, the Supreme Court announced 
the conditions under which a defendant's challenge to the warrant affi-
davit is sufficient to entitle the defendant to a veracity hearing. Under 
the rule of Franks, if the defendant makes a "substantial preliminary 
showing" 15 that the warrant affidavit contained a false statement made 
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, 
and if the allegedly false statement was crucial to the finding of proba-
ble cause, the court must conduct a veracity hearing to assess the de-
fendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the warrant affidavit. At the 
10. 438 U.S. at 156. Evidently, the name of the youth whom Franks was accused of having 
assaulted sounded similar to Bailey. 
II. The Court appended the affidavit to the Franks opinion. 438 U.S. at 172. 
12. /d. at 158. 
13. /d. at 160. 
14. Franks v. State, 373 A.2d 578 (Del. Super., 1977). 
15. 438 U.S. at 155. 
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veracity hearing, the defendant must establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the false statement was the product of the affiant's 
perjury or reckless disregard 16 and that the deletion of the false state-
ment renders the affidavit insuffi~ient to establish probable cause. 17 If 
the defendant can satisfy both burdens, the Court's holding in Franks 
requires the trial judge to void the search warrant and to exclude the 
fruits of the search from the evidence to be offered at trial. 18 
Case law which had evolved in the state and lower federal courts 
prior to Franks essentially had articulated three different rules. Some 
courts had held that a defendant had no right to a hearing to ascertain 
the truth of the affiant's assertions contained in a facially sufficient 
search warrant. 19 California courts had pursued a second approach 
and concluded that a defendant had a right to a hearing if the affidavit 
in support of the search warrant contained any negligent misrepresen-
tations, regardless of the affiant's good faith.2° Finally, the Seventh 
Circuit, adopting a third position, held that a defendant had a right to a 
veracity hearing only if misrepresentations in the warrant affidavit were 
the product of the affiant's bad faith. 21 After Franks, only the second 
and third approaches remain viable. 
B. The Pre-Franks Rules 
1. Theodor v. Superior Court 
In Theodor v. Superior Court,22 the California Supreme Court con-
cluded that the allegation that the affidavit was based on an unreasona-
ble but good faith misrepresentation entitled the defendant to a 
veracity hearing.23 If the challenged assertion in the affidavit is reason-
able and was made in good faith, the Theodor court stated, the warrant 
16. In the Court's view, and therefore for purposes of this comment, perjury and reckless 
disregard for the truth are synonymous so far as the integrity of the fourth amendment is con-
cerned. The Court does not distinguish between those two impositions on the amendment. 
17. 438 U.S. at 156. 
18. Id. 
19. Liberto v. State, 248 Ark. 350,356-57, 451 S.W.2d 464,468 (1970); State v. Williams, 169 
Conn. 322, 327-29, 363 A.2d 72, 76-77 (1975); People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140, 144-46, 258 N.E.2d 
341, 343-44, cerl. denied, 400 U.S. 882 (1970); State v. Lamb, 209 Kan. 453, 467-68, 497 P.2d 275, 
287 (1972); Caslin v. Commonwealth, 491 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Ky. 1973); Dawson v. State, II Md. 
App. 694,713-15, 276 A.2d 680, 690-91 (1971); Wood v. State, 322 So. 2d 462, 465 (Miss. 1975); 
State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 173-79, 293 A.2d 649, 653-56 (1972), cerl. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1 973); 
Brown v. State, 565 P.2d 697 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); Owens v. State, 217 Tenn. 544, 553, 399 
S.W.2d 507, 511 (1965); Phenix v. State, 488 S.W.2d 759, 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). 
20. See, e.g., Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 17, 90, 100-01, 501 P.2d 234, 243, 251, 104 
Cal. Rptr. 226, 235, 243 (1972) (en bane). See text accompanying notes 22-38 infra. 
21. See, e.g., United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973) (en bane). See text 
accompanying notes 39-54 infra. 
22. Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501 P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972). The 
Theodor court cited Lockridge v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. App. 2d 612, 622, 80 Cal. Rptr. 223, 
230 ( 1969): "Good faith . . . is immaterial, and cannot serve to rehabilitate an otherwise defective 
warrant." 8 Cal. 3d at 98 n.l3, 501 P.2d at 249 n.13, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 241 n.l3. 
23. 8 Cal 3d at 97, 501 P.2d at 248-49, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 240-41. 
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is unassailable. If, however, the assertion was made in good faith but is 
unreasonable, or if the assertion was made in bad faith, Theodor re-
quired the trial judge to invalidate the warrant.24 
The Theodor rationale may be analogized to the focus of two lead-
ing Supreme Court cases which developed the rule of reasonableness 
for cases involving warrantless arrests and searches.25 In Henry v. 
United States,26 the Supreme Court conceded that although the quan-
tum of evidence required to establish the suspect's guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt exceeds that necessary to support a finding of probable 
cause, the police officer's good faith belief that probable cause exists 
will not of itself establish its existence.27 In Henry, federal officers 
made a warrantless arrest and conducted a warrantless search incident 
to the arrest. Investigating a theft from an interstate shipment of whis-
key, the. officers twice observed the defendant placing cartons in a car 
in a residential area. Upon arresting the defendant and searching the 
car, the officers found and seized cartons containing radios stolen from 
an interstate shipment. 28 The Supreme Court determined that on the 
facts of the case, the officers did not have sufficient probable cause for 
the arrest when they stopped the car. The Court stated that "[p ]robable 
cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant 
a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed. " 29 
The mere fact that in Henry the officer in good faith believed that an 
offense had been committed was not sufficient to satisfy the fourth 
amendment safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. 30 
The Theodor court cited Beck v. Ohio 31 in which the Supreme 
Court reiterated the principles of Henry. In Beck, police officers had 
received unspecified "information" and "reports" about the defendant. 
The officers knew what the defendant looked like and knew that he had 
a gambling record. They stopped the defendant while he was driving 
his car, placed him under arrest and searched the car without obtaining 
either a search or arrest warrant. After the search at the scene proved 
fruitless, the officers took the defendant to the police station where an 
24. 8 Cal. 3d at 98, 501 P.2d at 249, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 241. See also United States v. Perry, 
380 F.2d 356, 358 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Ramos, 380 F.2d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1967); United 
States v. Poppit, 227 F. Supp. 73, 77, 78 (D. Del. 1964). 
25. The Supreme Court of California reasoned that "a mere good faith belief in the accuracy 
of the facts contained in an affidavit is insufficient." The court then cited to Beck v. Ohio, 379 
U.S. 89, 97 (1964), as support for the assertion that "this conclusion is in accord with established 
search and seizure principles which declare that in assessing probable cause, good faith alone is 
insufficient." 8 Cal. 3d at 98 n.l3, 501 P.2d at 49 n. l3, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 241 n. l3. Beck quoted 
Henry v. United States: "good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough." 361 U.S. 
98, 102 (1959). Therefore, the foregoing evaluation of the Theodor rationale examines the appli-
cability of the Beck and Henry "search and seizure principles" to the issue confronted in Franks. 
26. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). 
27. ld. at 1_02. 
28. ld. at 99-100. 
29. Jd. at 102. 
30. Jd. 
31. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). 
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in-custody search revealed clearing house slips on the defendant's per-
son.32 The Beck Court reasoned that if the police officer's subjective 
good faith belief in the existence of probable cause would alone estab-
lish its existence, only at the discretion of the police would the people 
be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects."33 
The Theodor court adopted the position that if a mere good faith 
belief on the part of the police officer that probable cause exists in the 
warrantless search and seizure situation is insufficient to establish prob-
able cause, the good faith of the warrant affiant should not insulate the 
warrant from a veracity hearing.34 Several commentators,35 including 
some of those cited in the Franks opinion,36 have embraced the logic of 
the analogy suggested by the Theodor court. They have noted that 
good faith errors in supporting affidavits can be so critically in~ccurate 
as to destroy probable cause. 37 They argue that the assertion that a 
negligent misrepresentation contained in a warrant affidavit was made 
in good faith should no more preclude a challenge to the warrant at a 
veracity hearing than the officer's good faith belief in the legality of a 
search legitimates an otherwise illegal search. 38 
2 Carmichael v. United States 
The Seventh Circuit, in Carmichael v. United States, 39 articulated 
a more stringent standard than that embodied in the Theodor court's 
rule. Judge Cummings, speaking for the circuit en bane, concluded 
that a court should not suppress evidence unless the reviewing judge 
finds that the officer was either intentionally or recklessly untruthful.40 
The Seventh Circuit found that a merely negligent misrepresentation, 
assailable under Theodor, should not be a basis for quashing a warrant 
at a veracity hearing.41 The Carmichael court cited two bases for its 
conclusion. First, the court noted, the exclusionary rule's primary goal 
32. /d. at 90. 
33. /d. at 97, quoting U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. See also United States v. Henderson, 17 
F.R.D. I, 2 ( 1954). In this case of mistaken identity, the court found it incongruous "to give the 
same effect to mistaken facts as to correct facts," simply because the police officer honestly be-
lieved that the defendant was the same person previously convicted. In Tehan v. United States ex 
rei. Shott, 382 U .S. 406 ( 1966), the Court asserted that if the courts accept the basic postulate that 
the goal of the trial is to determine the truth, then the mere good faith of police officers will not 
suffice in place of the truth. 
34. 8 Cal. 3d at 98, 501 P.2d at 249, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 241. See text accompanying notes 14-
15 supra. 
35. See, e.g. , Mascolo, Impeaching the Credibility of Affidavits for Search Warrants: Piercing 
the Presumption of Validity, 44 CONN. B.J. 9 (1970). The author cites Henry and Beck at 13, n.22. 
36. See sources cited 438 U.S. at 168, n.7. 
37. Mascolo, supra note 35, at 13. 
38. See, e.g., Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 1974 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 
839, 848. But see Williams v. Gould, 486 F.2d 547, 548 (9th Cir. 1973); Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents, _156 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972). 
39. 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973) (en bane). 
40. Id. at 988. 
41. /d. 
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is to deter police misconduct; good faith errors, however, cannot be 
deterred.42 Although the Carmichael court conceded that negligent 
misrepresentations are theoretically deterrable, it concluded that no 
feasible test existed for determining whether an officer was negligent or 
entirely innocent in not checking his facts more thoroughly before ap-
plying for a warrant.43 In addition, the court stated, if the innocent 
misrepresentation is based on the police officer's reasonable belief, the 
misrepresentation does not negate probable cause or make the search 
unconstitutionally unreasonable.44 The fourth amendment protects the 
people's right to be secure against unreasonable searches and 
seizures;45 if, therefore, the officer has a reasonable belief in the exist-
ence of probable cause, the fourth amendment's integrity is main-
tained. 
C The Franks Analysis 
The Supreme Court decided Franks v. Delaware against this ana-
lytical background. The majority as well as the dissenting opinion 
noted the competing values46 which necessarily lead to the imposition 
of limitations on the right to attack affiant veracity in regard to a 
facially sufficient warrant.47 Before defining the scope of its rule, how-
ever, the Franks Court responded to each of six arguments offered by 
the State to support its contention tliat veracity challenges were im-
proper. First, the State of Delaware argued that application of the ex-
clusionary rule to yet another end--deterrence of affiant perjury-
would exact too great a societal cost.48 The Court conceded it had been 
reluctant to extend the exclusionary rule to "collateral areas, such as 
civil or grand jury proceedings;"49 the rule's application to situations in 
which the fourth amendment violation had been substantial and delib-
erate, however, has gone unquestioned. In the Court's view, until a 
more desirable alternative surfaces, the exclusionary rule remains the 
42. /d. 
43. /d. at 989. 
44. ld 
45. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. See notes 6 supra & 76 infra. 
46. Justice Rehnquist's dissent, joined by Chief Justice. Burger, argued that, on balance, the 
interests which mitigate against-veracity hearings (expediency, reluctance to extend exclusionary 
rule) outweigh those relied upon by the majority. The dissent concluded that "ingenious lawyers" 
wiD use the veracity hearing as one more means of burdening the criminal dO<:ket. 438 U.S. 181-
87. Regarding the balancing of conflicting interests which are pertinent to fourth amendment 
inquiry see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 354 ( 1974); 
Note, Warrantless Entry to Arrest: A Practical Solution to a Fourth Amendment Problem, 1978 U. 
ILL. L. F. 655, 658. 
47. 438 U.S. at 167. 
48. /d. at 166. 
49. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (permitting use of evidence obtained in. 
violation of the fourth amendment in civil proceedings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 
( 1974) (permitting use of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment before the grand 
jury). 
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most efficacious sanction yet devised. 50 
The State's second argument asserted that application of the exclu-
sionary rule to veracity attacks would "overlap" with existing perjury 
penalties such as criminal prosecutions, departmental discipline for 
misconduct, contempt of court, and civil actions. 51 The Court easily 
dispensed with this argument by noting that Mapp v. Ohio52 had im-
plicitly concluded that such alternatives were insufficient to uphold the 
integrity of the fourth amendment. 53 
Third, the State argued ~hat because the magistrate may inquire 
into the veracity of an affidavit prior to issuance of the warrant, the 
benefits of a post-search adversary proceeding are not worth the cost of 
exclusion. 54 The Court responded that the ex parte nature of the pre-
search warrant issuance procedure will not always be sufficient to un-
cover perjurious affidavits. The Co_!!rt also observed that the pre-search 
proceeding is often necessarily a hasty proceeding because the police 
must act before the evidence disappears. 55 
The Franks Court also rejected the State's fourth argument that a 
post-search veracity hearing would denigrate the dignity of the magis-
trate's function. The less finaJ56 the magistrate realizes his determina-
tion is, the State contended, the less conscientiously he will make his 
decisions. 57 Rejecting that argument, the Court noted that the need for 
50. 438 U.S. at 171. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415-20 
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting): 
Although I would hesitate to abandon it until some meaningful substitute is developed, the 
history of the Suppression Doctrine demonstrates that it is both conceptually sterile and prac-
tically ineffective in accomplishing its stated objective . . . . I do not propose . . . that we 
abandon the Suppression Doctrine until some meaningful alternative can be developed. 
But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring), in which the Chief Justice 
was prepared to advocate the immediate abolition of the exclusionary rule: "[i]ncentives for de-
veloping new procedures or remedies will remain minimal or non-existent so long as the exclu-
. sionary rule is retained in its present form." 428 U.S. at 500. See also LaFave & Remington, 
Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 
MICH. L. REv. 987, 1003 (1965); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 665, 667 (1970). 
51. 438 U.S. at 166. 
52. 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
53. 438 U.S. at 169. The Court cited Justice Douglas's concurrence in Mapp in which he 
quoted from Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949): 
Self-scrutiny is a lofty ideal, but its exaltation reaches new heights if we expect a District 
Attorney to prosecute himself or his associates for well-meaning violations of the search and 
seizure clause during a raid the District Attorney or his associates bas ordered. 
367 U.S. at 670. 
54. 438 U.S. at 166 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
55. /d. at 169. 
56. In regard to the finality issue, the dissent cited Justice Jackson's concurrence in Brown v. 
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953), which spoke to the question of the finality of Supreme Court 
decisions: "(R]eversal by a higher court is not proof justice is thereby better done . .. . We are 
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." 438 U.S. at 186 
(Rehnquist, J ., disse!!_ting). 
57. 438 U.S. at 167. Confidence in the integrity of the warrant issuance procedure may be 
misplaced. Sevilla, supra note 38, at 876. Some judges issue warrants without much concern for 
whether probable cause has been established by the supporting affidavits. In such cases, serious 
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a veracity hearing does not reflect the inherent abilities of the people 
who are magistrates, but rather the inherent shortcomings of the ex 
parte warrant issuance procedure. In addition, because the Franks de-
cision only extends to instances of perjury or reckless disregard for the 
truth, the magistrate still has a "broad field" in which to act as the sole 
safeguard of fourth amendment rights. 58 
Fifth, the State argued that defendants and counsel would abuse 
the veracity hearing, thereby further overloading the criminal dock-
ets.59 The Court responded to this argument by imposing the "substan-
tial preliminary showing" requisite.60 Such a "sensible threshhold 
showing" and "sensible substantive requirements for suppression," the. 
Court thought, precluded the possibility of any great strain on the judi-
ciary.61 
Finally, the State contended that the post-search veracity hearing 
is inappropriate because as a practical matter the affiant has little or no 
control of the affidavit's veracity. Hearsay, fleeting observations, and 
tips received from properly undisclosed informants62 may form the ba-
sis of the affidavit's probable cause assertion.63 The Franks Court did 
not expressly confront this final argument. The argument proves too 
much, however, by implying that because probable cause may be de-
rived from such sources, examination of affiant veracity is never desira-
review of the legality of the search is not performed unti-l the suppression hearing at which the 
defendant asserts that the police obtained the evidence in violation of the defendant's fourth 
amendment rights. LaFave & Remington, supra note 50, at 993. Professors LaFave and Reming-
ton also note that on occasion, when the actual case is tried before the judge who issued the search 
warrant, that same judge may reverse himself and find that the search warrant was invalid because 
the grounds upon which he issued the warrant were insufficient. /d. See also Wilson, How the 
Police Chief Sees It, HARPER'S MAGAZINE 140, 143 (April 1964). 
· Professor Grano asserts that the system in Philadelphia is not atypical. The police officer asks 
the assistant district attorney to approve the warrant and that prosecutor grants his approval after 
only a cursory reading. The officer then submits the warrant to a judge. The judge does not 
question the officer about the basis of the warrant. He simply issues the warrant as long as it 
seems facially sufficient "with nothing but the officer's uniform and oath attesting to the c~dibility 
of the facts." Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel' Spinelli-Harris Search Warrams and the 
Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 405, 415 (hereinafter cited as Grano]. But see L. 
TIFFANY, D. MciNTYRE & D. RoTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRJME 119-21 (1967), suggesting that 
magistrates do take their duty to review search warrant applications more seriously than they do 
arrest warrant applications. Professor Grano also concedes that search warrant affidavits are at 
least usually read, arrest warrants not always being afforded the same attention. Grano, supra, at 
415. The cases nevertheless offer examples of magistrates frequently discharging their duties with 
less than the desired dignity. See Note, Testing the Factual Basis For a Search Warran/, 61 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1529, 1531 n.22 (1967). See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 242 F.2d 534 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 976 (1957). 
58. 438 U.S. at 170. 
59. /d. at 167. 
60. /d. at 170. 
61. /d. The Court noted that its decision in no way attempted to resolve the issue of whether 
the identity of an informant must be disclosed once the "substantial preliminary showing" of 
falsity is offered. The Court only went so far as to say that the "substantial preliminary showing" 
standard negates the possibility of a veracity bearing for discovery purposes. /d. 
62. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). 
63. 438 U.S. at 167. 
, 
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ble. Intentional falsification poses a serious threat to the integrity of 
the fourth amendment regar_dless of whether the affiant is swearing to 
what he saw or to what some informant told him. According to the 
Court, the availability of a veracity hearing will vindicate the integrity 
of the warrant issuance procedure when an affiant has included perjuri-
ous assertions in the warrant complaint.64 
On the facts which Franks presented, the Court determined that it 
should not decide whether the defendant had made a sufficient proffer 
to entitle him to a veracity hearing. Because the Delaware judge had 
denied Franks's veracity challenge on the basis of its absolute rule bar-
ring veracity challenges, 65 the record contained no determination 
whether the defendant's challenge had met Franks's "substantial pre-
liminary showing" standard. Thus, the Court remanded for a reconsid-
eration of the facts in light of the test it had announced.66 
Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that "the framing of suitable 
rules to govern proffers in a matter properly left to the States,"67 pro-
vided that the state standards satisfy the tests announced in the Franks 
opinion.68 
In effect, the Franks Court adopted the Seventh Circuit's Carmi-
chael rule as the minimum constitutional standard. By making this 
choice, the Court elected not to mandate the availability of the veracity 
hearing to permit challenges, cognizable under Theodor, to warrants 
supported by unreasonable good faith misrepresentations. Before a 
warrant must be quashed, Franks requires that the misrepresentation 
be perjurious or so unreasonable as to be reckless.69 The Supreme 
Court's decision still leaves a "broad field"70 for the magistrate as the 
principal safeguard of fourth amendment guarantees at the ex parte 
issuance proceeding. When the police have been merely negligent, that 
is merely unreasonable, in checking or recording the facts relevant to 
the assertion of probable cause, the defendant has no federal constitu-
tional right to a Franks veracity hearing.71 Such n~gligent inaccura-
cies, if they are to preclude a legal search, must be uncovered at the ex 
parte warrant issuance proceeding. 
State courts are free to adopt the more liberal Theodor approach 72 
to grant a veracity hearing even when the police have made a less than 
reckless misrepresentation. The holding in Theodor, however, is incon-
64. /d. at 165. 
65. /d. at 160. 
66. On appeal from Franks's conviction, the Delaware Supreme Court had accepted what it 
deemed to be the majority view recognizing the absolute rule barring veracity challenges. Franks 
v. State, 373 A.2d 578 (Del. Super. 1977). 
67. 438 U.S. at 172. 
68. /d. 
69. /d. at 171. 
70. !d. at 170. 
71. !d. at 171. 
72. /d. at 172. 
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sistent with the traditional conception of the exclusionary rule as repre-
senting a balance be!ween competing social values: deterrence of 
police misconduct, on the one hand, and conviction of guilty persons, 
on the other. Although under the doctrine of Mapp v. Ohio,73 the 
fourth amendment requires per se exclusion of all evidence seized in 
direct violation of its commands, the Supreme Court had engaged in ad 
hoc balancing to limit the scope of the exclusionary rule in other ar-
eas. 74 Applying this balancing to the area of veracity challenges, courts 
should weigh the potential deterrent effect that these challenges would 
have on unreasonable police behavior. Balanced against that interest is 
the societal cost incurred by the exclusion of probative and admittedly 
reliable evidence. The exclusionary rule may require that a judge with-
hold what would otherwise be a finding of probable cause because evi-
dence illegally obtained- forms the basis of the warrant request.75 
Occasionally, however, the judge may find that the policeman by seiz-
ing evidence has not violated the spirit of the exclusionary rule because 
he has acted reasonably and in good faith;76 in this situation, the court 
should not invalidate the warrant because the cost of excluding the evi-
dence which forms the basis of the probable cause finding remains con-
stant while no deterrence of police misconduct is achieved. The 
Theodor court, however, failed to consider this balance; rather the 
court solely considered the probable-cause requirement while ignoring 
the fact that deterrence is impossible when the policeman acts in good 
faith. The Theodor court analogized to a warrantless search case 77 in 
support of its decision, but this analogy is a weak one. In the false 
affidavit context the police officer does not have unbridled discretion to 
make the probable cause determination. A magistrate passes on the 
sufficiency of the evidence contained in the affidavit.78 For this reason 
the Franks Court determined that in the case in which the magistrate 
has found probable cause based upon the officer's testimony, the exclu-
sionary rule serves as a check only on the affiant's good faith. 79 
73. 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
74. See text accompanying note 49 supra; if. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (balancing 
approach to question of whether state prisoners may raise fourth amendment claims already liti-
gated in state criminal proceedings on federal habeas corpus review); Desist v. United States, 394 
U.S. 244 (1969) (balancing approach to question of retroactivity of fourth amendment guaran-
tees); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S 165 (1969) (balancing approach to question of standing 
to assert fourth amendment rights); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (balancing 
approach to question of admissibility of tainted secondary evidence). 
75. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
76. This was the idea developed in Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973) (en bane). See 
_ text accompanying notes 39-45 supra. · 
77. 8 Cal. 3d at 98, SOl P.2d at 249, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 241. The Theodor court cited Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), and Lockridge v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. App. 2d 612, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
223 (1949). The Beck Court in tum cited Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). See notes 22 
and 25 supra. 
78. 438 U.S. at 169-70. -
79. This is an example of the balancing process which the Court espoused in Terry v. Ohio, 
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III. THE REQUIREMENT OF A SUBSTANTIAL PRELIMINARY SHOWING 
Franks requires that a defendant make a "substantial preliminary 
showing" of affiant perjury or reckless disregard for the truth before he 
is constitutionally entitled to a veracity hearing.8° Commentators have 
not agreed as to how great a burden the requirement imposes on a de-
fendant.81 Professor Grano considers the burden to be significant,82 
while a Connecticut court determined that it was rather minimal. 83 
The confusion is understandable in light of the Franks decision's fail-
ure to delineate clearly the elements of a "substantial preliminary 
showing" and by the Court's express ruling that the standards must be 
determined by state law.84 Whether a particular preliminary showing 
is sufficiently "substantial" will depend on the circumstances of each 
case; unfortunately, the nature of the issues appears to preclude a more 
precise standard. 85 
A. uGood Faith'' of the Affiant 
The Franks Court recognized the problem of intentional falsifica.;. 
tion by warrant affiants, typically police officers.86 The majority opin-
ion established that the defendant, as a prerequisite to obtaining a 
veracity hearing, must make "a substantial preliminary showing that a 
false statement knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard 
for the truth, was included in the warrant affidavit."87 Reckless disre-
gard for the truth is as great a violation of the fourth amendment as an 
intentional falsification of the affidavit. 88 Therefore, a "substantial pre-
liminary showing" of either entitles a defendant to a veracity hearing. 
The defendant must show more, however, than that the affiant made a 
good faith misrepresentation. 
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the issues presented in 
392 U.S. I ( 1968), in the stop and frisk context. See Note, Warrantless Entry to Arrest: A Practical 
Solution to a Fourth Amendment Problem, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 655, 658. 
80. 438 U.S. at 155. 
81. W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 4.4 at 69 (1979). See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF ~RE· 
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 290.3(11) (Proposed Official Draft, 1975) which provides that "the 
good faith of any testimony presented to the issuing authority and relied on to establish reason-
able cause for issuance of the warrant" may be contested at a veracity hearing only "upon prelimi-
nary motion, supported by affidavit, setting forth substantial basis for questioning the good faith 
of the testimony." 
82. Grano, supra note 57, at 425-27. 
83. State v. Anonymous, 30 Conn. Supp. 211, 309 A.2d 135 (1973). 
84. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra. 
85. This is unlike the Miranda situation, Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 
involving criteria which are sufficiently precise to be applied in federal and state courts alike. 
Franks requires, instead, a balancing process. 
86. 438 U.S. at 168. 
87. /d. at 155-56. 
88. Because the Franks Court found that the warrant clause takes the affiant's good faith as 
its premise, and recklessness indicates a lack of good faith, it inferred that both perjury and reck-
less disregard for the truth are coequal impositions on the fourth amendment. /d. 
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Franks by noting that the warrant clause89 itself is premised on the 
affiant's good faith. 90 The requirement that a warrant be supported by 
"Oath or affirmation" presupposes that the factual showing offered to 
comprise probable cause be "truJhful."91 The facts recited· in the war-
rant affidavit must be truthful, however, only to the extent "that the 
information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affi-
ant as true."92 If the affiant does not in good faith believe what is put 
forth in the warrant affidavit, or if the affiant unreasonably accepted 
the truth of the assertions in the affidavit, seizure of items pursuant to 
the warrant violates the fourth amendment. 
The veracity hearing provides the defendant with the opportunity 
to prove the affiant's bad faith or recklessness. Thus, the Franks verac-
ity hearing essentially operates to provide a defendant with procedural 
safeguards for fourth amendment rights beyond those available at the 
pre-issuance stage. Although initial inspection of the warrant is 
designed to ferret out all misrepresentations, be they the product of 
both good faith or bad,93 the magistrate's review of the warrant is an ex 
parte proceeding. The veracity hearing, in contrast, is an adversary 
proceeding;94 from a procedural standpoint, therefore, it is more com-
petent to uncover police perjury or reckless disregard for the truth. 95 
B. Police Peljury 
Police perjury is prevalent.96 The pollee are often not adverse to 
89. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. See notes 6 and 33 supra. 
90. 438 U.S. at 164. 
91. Justice Black.mun quoted the analysis of Judge Frankel in United States v. Halsey, 257 
F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), qffd, Docket No. 31,369 (2d Cir. 1967) (unreported): 
"'[W)hen the Fourth Amendment demands a factual showing to comprise 'probable cause,' the 
obvious assumption is that there will be a truthful showing.'" 438 U.S. at 164-65. 
92. /d. at 165. 
93. The Franks veracity bearing only recognizes challenges to a warrant based on alleged 
bad faith misrepresentations by the affiant. 
94. 438 U.S. at 169. 
95. /d. 
96. See United States v. Hood & Hood, 493 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Mar-
shall, 488 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1973); Veney v. United States, 344 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1965); People 
v. Carter, 26 Cal. App. 3d 862, 103 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1972); People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 270 
N.E.2d 709, 321 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1971); People v. McMurty, 64 Misc. 2d 63, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194 
(Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1970); E.J. HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE 105 (1931); Grano, supra note 57; 
Sevilla, supra note 38; Younger, Tlte Peljury Routine, 204 THE NATION 596-97 (1967); Note, Effect 
of Mapp v. Oltio on Police Searclt & Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. 
PRos. 87 (1968); Comment, Police Peljury in Narcotics "J)ropsy" Cases: A New Credibility Gap, 60 
GEo. L.J . 507 ( 1971 ) .. q: United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1973) (Two of 
the agents seemed quite willing to make false affidavits. One of them, confronted with facts indi-
cating the falsity of his affidavit, did not admit it to be false, but merely "inconsistent." ); People v. 
Carter, 26 Cal. App. 3d 862, 875, 103 Cal. Rptr. 327, 335 (1972) (citing trial judge in Carter's 
PENAL CoDE§ 1538.5 hearing: "I am not too impressed by officer Barfield anyway. I think that if 
he hadn' t been a police officer . . . I would have referred him to the District Attorney for an 
investigation as to perjury .. .. "); People v. Dickerson, 273 Cal. App. 2d 645, 650, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
400, 403 ( 1969) (natural desire of police officer may cause him to be less than candid in regard to 
the_collateral inquiry which does not go to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence). See also J . 
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engaging in perjurious conduct to salvage a conviction.97 An officer 
with no flair for perjury could easily fabricate a search warrant that 
would satisfy a magistrate and pass constitutional muster.98 In Franks, 
the Court sought to curb police perjury by requiring that the defendant 
receive a veracity hearing when he has made a "substantial preliminary 
showing" of police perjury.99 Logically, Franks will be an effective 
check on police perjury only if the courts apply the preliminary show-
ing standard in a manner consistent with the Franks objective: the ex-
posure and deterrence of perjury and reckless disregard for the truth on 
the part of law enforcement officials. The courts, therefore, must not 
apply the Franks "substantial preliminary showing" standard so nar-
rowiy as to insulate effectively police perjury and reckless disregard for 
the truth. Federal and state courts alike should balance these concerns: 
the constitutional requirement of probable cause; the deterrence ration-
ale supporting the exclusionary rule; the practical ability of the defend-
ant in each individual situation to expose the police officer's 
malfeasance; and, in particular, the avoidance of police perjury. 
The Franks Court cited several commentators100 who had ex-
pressed concern with intentional falsification by police officers in the 
warrant affidavit. These commentators, in support of their contentions 
that police perjury is widespread, point to the so-called problem of 
"dropsy." 101 "Dropsy" cases began to arise shortly after the Supreme 
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 215 (1966): "[T)he policman respects the necessity for 'com-
plying' with the arrest laws. His 'compliance,' however, may take the form of post hoc manipula-
tion of the facts rather than before-the-fact behavior." But cf. Mascolo, supra note 77, at 29 n.97 
(suggesting that "[O)utright perjury by law enforcement officials is relatively uncommon"). Sev-
eral of the cases echo that view. See United States v. Tucker, 380 F.2d 206, 212 (2d Cir. 1967) 
("[O]utright peljury by federal agents is not a common occurrence"); United States ex rei. Coffey 
v. Fay, 344 F.2d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 1965) ("[W]e do not suppose that outright perjury by FBI agents 
is a common occurrence .... "). 
97. Grano, supra note 57, at 409, n.24. Professor Grano offers these examples: 
[I]n one case the police admitted that they were not at work at the time their records indicated 
they had warned the defendant of his constitutional rights. Nevertheless, they expressed a 
willingness to testify consistently with their records. In another case, the police suggested 
changing an interrogation record to remove inconsistencies so that the record could be intro-
duced into evidence. After one suppression hearing was lost by a detective who testified that 
the defendant had expressed a desire to stop answering questions, other officers .. . ex-
pressed disbelief that the detective admitted the fact. 
/d q Oaks, supra note 50, at 739-42 (reporting that upper echelon officials admitted that police 
officers manipulate facts). 
98. Grano, supra note 57, at 411. 
99. 438 U.S. at 155-56. 
100. /d. at 168, n.7. 
101. While Professor Younger was a judge in a New York criminal court he heard a case 
which presented the typical "dropsy" scenario. The policman testified that the defendant stepped 
out of a doorway at night, saw the officer, dropped a container of marijuana and walked away. 
The defendant testified that in light of his narcotics experience, he knew that as long as he kept the 
marijuana on his person, out of plain view, the only way the police officer could seize the mari-
juana and arrest him for possession would be by conducting an illegal search. And the defendant 
stated that he realized that any evidence obtained as a product of an illegal search would necessar-
ily be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule. The defendant bluntly asserted before the 
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Court ruled in Mapp v. Ohio 102 that the Weeks v. United States 103 ex-
clusionary rul~ applied to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. After Mapp, police officers learned that truthfully reporting the 
circumstances of their searches resulted in the exclusion of evidence 
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. The police then dis-
covered, according to this argument, that if the defendant drops the 
evidence, typically narcotics, to the ground and the officer then arrests 
him, the search is "reasonable" and the evidence admissible. The re-
sult of the discovery was a marked increase in the number of cases in 
which the police testified that immediately prior to the arrest the de-
fendant dropped narcotics to the ground. 104 
Presumably, the Supreme Court was aware of the "dropsy" situa-
tion and aware also that police peijury constitutes a grave threat to the 
integrity of the fourth amendment. The situation in Franks posed a 
threat of police peijury analogous to that presented in the "dropsy" 
cases. 105 Arguably the Supreme Court intended that the judge who 
rules on the motion requesting a veracity hearing would take into ac-
count both the surrepticious nature of police perjury and the difficulty 
which a defendant will encounter in obtaining evidence suggesting per-
jury has occurred. The dilemma of the defendant attempting to contro-
vert "dropsy" testimony suggests the difficult situation of a defendant 
who attempts to controvert the assertions contained in a facially suffi-
cient warrant. Often the judge who is to rule on the motion will have 
little more to weigh than the word of the defendant against the word of 
the police officer. 
The better view, therefore, is that lower courts should grant the 
defendant a veracity hearing when his proffer suggests the real possibil-
ity that the police engaged in a course of peijurious behavior which the 
initial warrant issuance procedure, because of its ex parte nature, did 
not expose. Arguably, the Franks opinion requires only that the de-
fendant convince the judge of the substantial possibility of affiant per-
jury106 and that his motion is neither frivolous nor a delaying tactic; 107 
coun "(t)he last thing I would do is drop the marijuana to the ground." People v. McMuny, 64 
Misc. 2d 63, 64, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1970). 
Professor Younger, in the course of his opinion in the case, observed that when one looks at 
the series of "dropsy" cases, it becomes clear that the police are committing peljury, at least in 
some of the cases, possibly in nearly all of them. Were the question open in New York, Professor 
Younger would have held that the state must have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the search (or lack thereot) and seizure was lawful. That suspicion of police officers' 
veracity is the basis for Younger's conclusion that given the .. slightest independent contradiction 
of the police officer's testimony or corroboration of the defendant's testimony, the coun should 
suppress the evidence." /d. at 67, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 198. 
102. 367 u.s. 643 ( 1961 ). 
103. 232 u.s. 383 (1914). 
104. Younger, supra note 96. The officer's testimony is, for the most pan, identical from case 
to case and defense lawyers and prosecutors now refer to this as "dropsy" testimony. 
105. See generally Grano, supra note 57. 
106. To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's attack must be more than con-
clusory and must be supponed by more than a mere desire to cross-examine. There must be 
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the defendant's evidence need not be conclusive. The quantity of evi-
dence which constitutes a "substantial preliminary showing" in any 
given case, of course, will depend on the circumstances of that particu-
lar case. 
Courts which did permit veracity hearings even prior to Franks 
generally required the defendant to introduce factual allegations sup-
porting the charges of police petjury. 108 In United States v. IJun-
nings, 109 for example, the Second Circuit refused to grant the 
defendant a veracity hearing. Although the court did not explain its 
determination in precise terms, it concluded that a defendant should be 
granted a veracity hearing "only when there has been an initial show-
ing of falsehood or other imposition on the magistrate." 110 That for-
mulation of a preliminary showing standard is too inflexible to 
accommodate the delicate balancing process envisioned by the Franks 
Court. 
The IJunnings court cited Judge Frankel's opinion in United States 
v. Halsey, 111 in which a federal district court had concluded that the 
quantum of evidence which is required to support a search warrant is 
measured by less stringent standards than the evidence required to es-
tablish guilt. 112 Once again the standard is not drawn with much preci-
sion, but the tenor of the Court's comparison suggests a requirement of 
specificity which is so strict that it effectively defeats the purpose of 
~Franks: ensuring the good faith of the warrant affiant. Certainly, in 
some situations the defendant may not be able to inject more than a 
reasonable doubt, because the facts of the situation render any greater 
showing impossible. 
IV. McCRA r: THE QuESTION RESERVED 
The Supreme Court in Franks considered the issue-of affiant ve-
racity in regard to the affiant's assertions about his own activities. 113 
The Court chose not to consider the "difficult question'' of whether a 
court must require disclosure of a confidential informant's identity 
allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations 
must be accompanied by an offer of proof. They should point out specifically the portion of 
the warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a state-
ment of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses 
should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained. 
438 U.S. at 171. Arguably, the Court's acknowledgement that the defendant may not be able to 
furnish affidavits or other reliable statements of witnesses and that the Court would accept in their 
stead a satisfactory explanation of their absence, recognizes the potentially difficult situation a 
defendant seeking a veracity hearing may confront. 
107. /d. 
108. See Grano, supra note 57, at 424. 
109. 425 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1969). 
110. /d. at 840. 
Ill. /d., 257 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
112. 257 F. Supp. at 1007. 
I 13. 438 U.S. at 170. 
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once the defendant has cast sufficient doubt on the affiant's credibil-
ity.114 Thus, lower courts must now grapple with this important, un-
resolved issue. 
Supreme Court precedent has established that an affiant may rely 
entirely on the testimony of an undisclosed informant to establish the 
probable cause required for the issuance of a warrant. 115 Conceivably, 
an officer-affiant may avoid a possible veracity challenge by basing the 
entire probable cause assertion on the statements of an undisclosed in-
formant. 
In People v. Solimine, 116 the New York Court of Appeals denied 
the defendant's requested veracity attack because the defendant sought 
to attack the veracity of the police informer rather than of the detec-
tive-affiant.117 That holding well depicts the ultimate inefficacy and in-
justice of a rigid, inflexible preliminary showing standard. If the 
defendant is unable to provide sufficient factual support for his allega-
tions of misrepresentation in a warrant affidavit because the inform-
ant's identity is not disclosed to him, the fourth amendment protection 
afforded by Franks becomes entirely chimerical. 
A. McCray v. Illinois 
In McCray v. Illinois, 118 the defendant argued that the trial judge 
had erred in refusing to disclose the identity of an informant at a pre-
trial hearing held to resolve a probable cause challenge to the suffi-
ciency of a warrant. The Court rejected the defendant's argument and 
held that, if the judge is convinced of the informant's credibility and of 
the reliability of his information, the fourteenth amendment 119 does not 
mandate disclosure of the informant's identity "upon mere de-
mand."120 The lower courts must now reread McCray in light of 
Franks~ holding and attempt to reconcile the divergent interests repre-
sented by the two opinions. 
Police arrested McCray for possession of narcotics. At the pretrial 
114. /d. An undisclosed informant is one who furnishes the police with information and 
thereby gives the police reason to arrest or search. Quinn, McCray v. Illinois: Probable Cause and 
the Informer Privilege, 45 DENVER L.J. 399, 400 (1968). 
115. United States v. Harris, 403 U .S. 573 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 
(1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See also Comment, Informer's Word as the Basis for 
Probable Cause in the Federal Courrs, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 840 (1965). 
116. 18 N.Y.2d 477, 276 N.Y.S.2d 882, 223 N.E.2d 341 (1966). 
117 .. The court cited, id. at 479, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 884, 223 N.E.2d at 344; People v. Alfinito, 16 
N.Y.2d 181, 264 N.Y.S.2d 243, 211 N.E.2d 644 (1965). 
118. 386 U .S. 300 (1967). 
119. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
120. The Court restated its holding in McCroy_in_the Franks opinion. 438 U.S. at 170. 
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hearing he stated that until one-half hour before his arrest he was at a 
friend's home. Upon leaving the house he walked with a woman for a 
short distance; he left the woman and was walking through an alley 
when police officers stopped him. The officers did not produce a search 
or arrest warrant, but, nevertheless, searched the defendant and found 
narcotics. The officers testified that, on the morning of the arrest, they 
had spoken with an informant who told them that the defendant was 
selling narcotics and had narcotics in his possession. The informant 
also allegedly told the officers where they could find the defendant. 
The informant, the officers testified, went with the police and pointed 
out the defendant before leaving the area. The officers further stated 
that when the defendant saw the police car he "hurriedly walked be-
tween two buildings." The arresting officer testified that he had known 
the informant for about one year, and the informant had on at least 
fifteen or sixteen occasions supplied him with narcotics information 
which had resulted in numerous arrests and convictions. 121 The officer 
even provided the names of those who had been convicted of narcotics 
violations based on the informant's tips. When defense counsel in-
quired of the informant's identity, however, the court sustained the 
State's objection. 122 
In upholding the trial court's ruling that the informant's identity 
could remain undisclosed, the Supreme Court relied principally on the 
opinion of Chief Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court 
in State v. Burnett, 123 and on Professor Wigmore's description of the 
informer's privilege.t 24 The Court acknowledged that allowing the de-
fendant access to the informant's identity exacts too great a price. Law 
enforcement officials depend on informants to a considerable extent. 
Revelation of the informant's identity compromises his usefulness to 
the state and discourages potential informants from offering informa-
tion to the police. 
The McCray Court, however, qualified the informant's privilege. 
The Court concluded that when the officer-affiant's credibility is a sub-
stantial issue, the magistrate, _prior to issuance of the warrant, may or-
der disclosure. 125 Likewise, when law enforcement officials have 
conducted the search without a warrant, the judge hearing the suppres-
sion motion may order disclosure of the informant's identity if he 
121. A second arresting officer also testified to the reliability of the informant. 386 U.S. at 
303-04. 
122. 386 U.S. at 302-05. The Supreme Court of Illinois in its consideration of the McCray 
case, People v. McCray, 33 Ill. 2d 66, 72, 210 N.E.2d 161, 164 (1963), described the rule of disclo-
sure in Illinois. See also People v. Nettles, 34 Ill. 2d 52,213 N.E.2d 536 (1966); People v. Connie, 
34 Ill. 2d 353, 215 N.E.2d 280 (1966); People v. Freeman, 34 Ill. 2d 362, 215 N.E.2d 206 (1966); 
People v. Miller, 34 Ill. 2d 527,216 N.E.2d 793 (1966). See also People v. Pitts, 26 Ill. 2d 395, 186 
N.E.2d 357 (1962); People v. Parren, 24 Ill. 2d 572, 183 N.E.2d 662 (1962). 
123. 42 N.J. 377, 385-88, 201 A.2d 39, 43-45 (1964). 
124. 8 J. WtGMORE, EviDENCE§ 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
125. 386 U.S. at 307-08. 
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deems it necessary in order to determine the officer's veracity. 126 The· 
McCray Court recognized the need for reconciling the defendant's in-
terest in challenging the officer's veracity and the state's interest in pro-
tecting its informants. 127 When the affiant-officer's credibility . is 
suspect, the Court's opinion in McCray seems to acknowledge the ne-
cessity of disclosure. Franks involves a third scenario not addressed in 
McCray. In Franks the law enforcement officials had a search warrant 
when they conducted their search. When the defendant satisfies the 
Franks "substantial preliminary showing" requirement, however, he 
has established the same need to verify the affiant's veracity and thu~ to 
disclose the informant's identity as existed in McCray. 
B. Reconciling McCray with Franks 
A recent Illinois appellate court case illustrates the necessity of 
reading the McCray decision in a manner consistent with the Court's 
reasoning in Franks. In People v. Anderson, 128 the police officer ob-
tained a search warrant on the basis of a statement made by an inform-
ant who claimed that he purchased a controlled substance from the 
defendant at the defendant's residence. The informant stated that he 
observed marijuana while at the defendant's residence and that he wit-
nessed the defendant's sale of cocaine to another unnamed individual. 
The police officer then swore that he accompanied the informant to the 
defendant's residence and watched the informant enter the house. The 
police claimed that when the informant came out of the house he had 
cocaine in his possession which the informant alleged he had purchased 
from the defendant. 
The defendant moved to quash the search warrant and to suppress 
the evidence which the police seized. The defendant denied that the 
events took place, and sought disclosure of the identity of the inform-
ant who was a material witness to the events described in the officer's 
complaint for search warrant. The defendant was unable to offer any 
conclusive evidence that the officer had lied about the facts reported by 
the undisclosed informant, if the informant did in fact even exist. 
Judge Trapp, writing for the majority, read Franks narrowly and, 
thus, frustrated Franks~ underlying purpose. He asserted that the bur-
den is on "the defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that perjurious statements were the foundation for the grant of 
the search warrant." 129 Judge Trapp failed to cite a specific portion of 
the Franks opinion to support his assertion, but generally relied on 
Franks for support. The Franks Court, however, did not place such a 
126. /d. 
127. /d. at 307. The Court adopted the language of Chief Justice Weintraub in State v. Bur-
nett, 42 N.J. 317, 201 A.2d 39 (1964). 
128. 74 Ill. App. 3d 363, 392 N.E.2d 938, 30 Ill. Dec. 173 (4th Dist. 1979). 
129~ -/d,-at-369,. 392 N.E.2d at 943, 30 Ill. Dec. at 178. 
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preliminary burden upon the defendant. Franks did hold that the de-
fendant at a veracity hearing must prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard for the truth. 130 
Franks does not, however, impose that burden on the defendant in his 
initial request for a veracity hearing. Logically, the defendant should 
bear the heavier burden only after he receives the hearing. The verac-
ity hearing would be a mere repetitive, insubstantial informality if the 
right to obtain the hearing were predicated upon the satisfaction of the 
same criteria imposed on the defendant to establish reckless disregard 
at the hearing itself. Necessarily, then, the defendant's burden of proof 
for obtaining a veracity hearing must be less than a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
In a dissent in an earlier Illinois Supreme Court case, 131 Justice 
Schaefer had recognized the difficult position of the defendant in a 
factual scenario such as that presented in People v. Anderson. Justice 
Schaeffer cited Justice Traynor's opinion in Priestly v. Superior Court 132 
and concluded that when the defendant's conviction turns on whether 
probable cause existed for an arrest or search, and when that determi-
nation in tum depends upon the existence and reliability of an in-
former, the court must require disclosure. 133 Otherwise, Justice 
Schaeffer argued, the court is incapable of making a rational appraisal, 
and the police officer alone conclusively determines the validity of his 
own actions. Without disclosure of the informant's identity, the de-
fendant cannot "effectively contest the policeman's opinion as to [the 
informant's] reliability." 134 
V. A PROPOSAL 
The superimposition of Franks on the array of cases dealing with 
the disclosure of an informant's identity necessitates a compromise to 
reconcile two conflicting interests. Analysis of the relevant concerns 
suggests acceptable compromises by establishing new standards for the 
burden of proof and by allowing in camera disclosure in certain situa-
tions. 
A. Burdens of Proof 
If the challenged warrant's probable cause assertion is based on 
130. 438 U.S. at 156. 
131. People v. Durr, 28 Ill. 2d 308, 315, 192 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Schaefer, Klingbiel, 
Hershey, JJ., dissenting). 
132. 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958). 
133. 28 Ill. 2d at 318, 192 N.E.2d at 384. 
134. /d., 192 N.E.2d at 384. In support of the opinions of Justices Traynor and Schaefer see 
Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 
1945); Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932); United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 
639 (W.D. Ky. 1937); United States v. Blich, 45 F.2d 627 (D.C. Wyo. 1930); Smith v. State, 169 
Tenn. 633, 90 S.W. 2d 523 (1936) . . 
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the word of an undisclosed informant, courts should require in cam-
era 135 disclosure of the informant and grant the defendant a veracity 
hearing when two conditions are present: first, when the probable 
cause portion of the complaint for search warrant is supported either 
entirely or primarily by an undisclosed informant; and second, when 
the defendant puts the officer's veracity in issue to the satisfaction of 
the judge hearing the motion for a veracity hearing. When the police-
man has relied upon an informant, the burden that the court should 
place on the defendant attempting to challenge the policeman's verac-
ity is necessarily vague. To be fair and to serve the goals established by 
Franks, the burden imposed on the defendant should not be as high 
when an informant is involved as· when the policeman relied on his 
own first hand knowledge. 
The very hearsay nature of the policeman's assertions makes the 
defendant's task of casting doubt on the policeman's veracity consider-
ably more burdensome; seldom will the defendant be able to prove that 
the policeman misrepresented what the unidentified informant report-
edly said. The prosecution should be able to avoid disclosure of the 
informant and the veracity hearing only by proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the challenge to the officer's veracity is un-
founded. The placement of that burden on the prosecution is 
consistent with the suggestion of a New York court that the state 
should have to prove that the seizure is lawful in a "dropsy" situa-
tion.136 As noted earlier in this discussion, the potential for police 
abuse in the Franks-McCray situation is fully as real as in the "dropsy" 
situation. 137 
B. In Camera Disclosure 
Under the test suggested here, in camera disclosure would be re-
135. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 599-600 (1971) (Harlan, J. , dissenting): "[l]t 
would seem that . . . informers could often be brought before the magistrate where he could 
assess their credibility for himself. . . . I do not understand the Government to be asserting that 
effective law enforcement will often dictate that the identity of informants be kept secret from 
federal magistrates themselves." 
136. People v. McMurty, 64 Misc. 2d 63, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1970). See note 
101 supra. The court's alloc~tion of the burden of proof is echoed to a large extenCin Comment, 
Police Peljury in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility Gap, 60 GEo. L.J. 507, 523 (1971): 
It is . . . necessary for the courts to adopt procedures calculated to reduce the likelihood that 
an officer will be successful by resorting to peljury. 
It is suggested that this result can be achieved by closely scrutinizing dropsy testimony 
and by requiring the government to prove the legality of a warrantless arrest or search by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
In People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 321 N.Y.S.2d 884, 270 N.E.2d 709 (1971), the District Attor-
ney of New York County joined various defendants to argue that the burden of proof in "dropsy" 
cases ought to be shifted to the state, in order to alleviate the possibility of peljured police testi-
mony. The court of appeals rejected that argument because it found that the suggested shift in 
burden would not alleviate the problem of police peljury, and, therefore, stare decisis mandates 
adherence to the present rule. 
137. See text accompanying notes 1()()..()5 supra. 
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quired only if the probable cause portion of the complaint for search 
warrant is supported either entirely or primarily by an undisclosed in-
formant and the defendant had cast sufficient doubt upon the police-
man's credibility. The Second Circuit suggested the limitation in a 
similar context in a post-McCray case, United States v. Comissiong. 138 
In that case, the court considered a challenge to a warrantless arrest 
and subsequent search for which probable cause had been established, 
at least in part, by the tip of an undisclosed informant. The Second 
Circuit, however, found that material other than the information ob-
tained from the informant justified the arrest and search. On that basis, 
the court denied disclosure, stating that disclosure of the informant's 
identity would be required only when the informant's assertions consti-
tute the "essence or core or main bulk" of the probable cause evi-
dence. 139 Thus, the court correctly acknowledged that the requirement 
of independent evidence which would in itself be sufficient to establish 
probable cause is an adequate safeguard against fabrication, "although 
obviously not a complete one." 140 Other post-McCray decisions have 
expounded a rule similar to the Second Circuit's in Comissiong. 141 
This comment's proposed test essentially adopts the Comissiong 
rule in the context of a request for a veracity hearing; this comment's 
"primarily or entirely" language is the equivalent of the Second Cir-
cuit's "essence or core or main bulk" language. Although the proposal 
offered here applies to judicial review of searches made pursuant to a 
search warrant, while Comissiong dealt with a warrantless arrest and 
search, the interest vindicated is common to both settings: the integrity 
of the warrant requirement. Although the Court has shown a predispo-
sition to presume the constitutionality of searches made pursuant to a 
138. 429 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1970). See also A MoDEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCE-
DURE§ 8.03(2) (Tent. Draft No.4, 1971), which would require disclosure when there is not sub-
stantial corroboration of the informant's testimony. But that disdosure is not required when the 
search was conducted pursuant to a warrant. Thus the Model Code distinguishes between the 
warrant and the non-warrant situation. 
The Code draws upon -the pre-McCray California approach distinguishing between the war-
rant and non-warrant situation. Compare Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 CaL 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 
(1958) (arrest and search without a warrant) with People v. Keener, 55 CaL 2d 714, 361 P.2d 587, 
12 CaL Rptr. 859 (1961): 
If a search is made pursuant to a warrant valid on its face and the only objection is that it was 
based on information given to a police officer by an unnamed informant, there is substantial 
protection against unlawful search and the necessity of applying the exclusionary rule in or-
der to remove the incentive to engage in unlawful searches is not present. The warrant, of 
course, is issued by a magistrate, not by a police officer, and will be issued only when the 
magistrate is satisfied by the supporting affidavit that there is probable cause. 
55 CaL 2d at 722-23, 361 P.2d at 591, 12 CaL Rptr. at 863. 
139. 429 F.2d at 838. The court relied heavily on the opinion of Chief Judge Lumbard in 
United States v. Tucker, 380 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1967). 
140. 429 F.2d at 839. 
141. See United States v. Colon, 419 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Malo, 417 F.2d 
1242 (2d Cir. 1969);-united States v. Cappabianca, 398 F.2d 356, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. 
denied, 393 U.S. 935, 946 (1968); United States v. Shyvers, 385 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1967). 
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warrant, 142 the Franks opinion confirms that the mere fact that a search 
was made incident to a warrant does not preclude review of the verac-
ity of warrant affiants. Therefore, the analogy from the warrantless sit-
uation to the warrant situation is justifiable in light of Franks. 
Ex parte in camera examination of the informant by the court al-
lows the court to evaluate the affiant's credibility without prematurely 
or needlessly exposing the informant's identity. Professor Grano has 
argued in favor of the in camera proceeding143 when the judge at the 
suppression hearing or the magistrate at the initial warrant issuance 
proceeding is unsure whether information o]?tained from a confidential 
informant satisfies the probable cause requirement. In that situation, 
Grano argues, the judge or magistrate ought to meet in camera with the 
informant and examine him. 144 A sealed record of the in camera hear-
ing could preserve the possibility of appellate review. 145 
Admittedly, public disclosure of the informant's identity would al-
low defendant's counsel the opportunity to cross-examine the inform-
ant and uncover informant lies that may go undetected in an ex parte 
hearing. 146 This argument, however, overlooks the crucial fact that the 
issue at the suppression hearing is whether the affiant lied and not 
whether the informant lied. 147 The court's concern, therefore, should 
be whether the officer-affiant had a reasonable belief in the veracity of 
the informant's assertions; the judge should be able to make this deter-
mination by listening to the informant's testimony without cross-exam-
ination by the defendant. 
The proposed accommodation of Franks and McCray is reason-
able, for the police may always avoid revelation of the identity of confi-
142. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). See generally, W. LAFAVE, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE § 4.1, at 3 ( 1978). 
143. Grano, supra note 57, at 446-47. 
144. Professor Grano notes, /d. at 446, that two United States courts of appeals have recom-
mended such an approach in the analogous situation where the trial judge must decide whether to 
order disclosure on the issue of guilt. See United States v. Winters, 420 F .2d 523, 524 (3d Cir. 
1970); Durham v. United States, 403 F.2d 190, 196-97 (9th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 
401 U.S. 481 (1971); United States v. Jackson, 384 F.2d 825, 827 (3d Cir. 1967). 
145. Grano, supra note 57, at 446. 
146. /d. at 447. See also LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law . .. Has Not 
. . . Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 368. "Currently, a number of Illinois trial judges en-
courage local police to bring informants into chambers for examination by the judge prior to 
issuance of a warrant on the basis of a complaint or affidavit by an officer referring to information 
from an unidentified informant." But for cases denying in camera examination upon defendant's 
request, see People v. Freeman, 34 Ill. 2d 362, 215 N.E.2d 206 (1966); People v. Nettles, 34 Ill. 2d 
52, 213 N.E.2d 536 (1966). In Freeman the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the denial on the basis 
that there was sufficient evidence that the police officer's testimony was credible to establish prob-
able cause. And see United States v. Day, 384 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1967). The sixth amendment 
right to confrontation does not have application in this setting. 386 U.S. 300, 313-14, citing 
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58,62 n.2 (1966): "Petitioner also presents the contention here that 
he was unconstitutionally deprived of the right to confront a witness against him, because the 
State did not produce the informant to testify against him. This contention we consider absolutely 
devoid of merit." 
147. Grano, supra note 57, at 447. 
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dential informants by not entirely or primarily relying on those 
informants for the probable cause assertion in the warrant application. 
Professor Grano has suggested that permitting the state to resist disclo-
sure when the probable cause showing does not rely entirely or prima-
rily on the informant's assertions does not sufficiently protect the fourth 
amendment right of the defendant. 148 He asserts that the officer who 
would invent a nonexistent informer, or distort information obtained 
from an existing informant, would not be reluctant to fabricate suffi-
cient corroboration. 149 When police officers, however; have relied on 
sufficient corroboration, or claim to have so relied, for the probable 
cause assertion, the proposal suggested here is not applicable. Rather, 
the Franks case itself furnishes the procedure for exposing intentional 
falsification and reckless disregard for the truth when no informant is 
involved.150 
Whether the question concerns the activities and assertions of the 
affiant and Franks itself applies, or whether the activities and assertions 
of an undisclosed informant and this comment's proposed procedure 
applies, the defendant is not without a means to contest the veracity of 
the warrant itself. The practical effect of the proposal is this: in those 
situations in which the police officer relies upon his own firsthand per-
ceptions, the defendant must make a "substantial preliminary show-
ing" of affiant bad faith or falsification before he is granted a veracity 
hearing; at the veracity hearing he must prove the same bad faith or 
falsification by a preponderance of the evidence before the evidence is 
excluded. In the case in which the affiant relies primarily or entirely on 
an unidentified informant, the state has the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that probable cause actually existed or 
the defendant will be entitled to have the judge question the informant 
in camera to determine the validity of a veracity hearing request. Re-
gardless of who carried the burden of proof at the suppression hearing, 
the defendant will always carry the burden of proving affiant bad faith 
or falsification at the veracity hearing. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For Franks v . .Delaware to have the effect which the Supreme 
Court intended, lower courts must recognize the precise problem re-
148. /d. at 443, 444. 
149. Professor Grano offers this scenario: 
(A]n officer may observe known addicts enter certain premises. Although his suspicions are 
now aroused, the officer may be powerless to establish further evidence. Hence, the inform-
ant is invented and given priority in chronology, with the surveillance now corroborating the 
tip. Because the police probably do not waste time conducting searches without at least some 
suspicion of criminal activity, the informant probably is invented most often in cases in which 
inadequate suspi<Oion could not mature legally into probable cause. Therefore, the corrobora-
tion . . . provides no assurance whatsoever of the informant's existence. 
/d. at 444. 
150. 438 U.S. at 170. 
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solved in that case-intentional falsification in the warrant affidavit by 
law enforcement officials. Crucial to the realization of the Court's goal 
is careful adherence by the lower courts to the Franks "substantial pre-
liminary showing" standard. The Court's requirement that the defend-
ant make a substantial preliminary showing of perjury or reckless 
disregard is designed to prevent the transformation of veracity hearings 
into mere tools of discovery or delay for the defendant. Of equal im-
portance, however, was the Franks Court's concern that courts not be 
unintentional accessori~s to coverups of police bad faith or fabrication. 
Lower courts will also be required to confront the question ex-
pressly unresolved in Franks: whether a reviewing court must ever re-
quire the revelation of the informant's identity once a substantial 
preliminary showing of falsity has been made. In camera disclosure of 
the informant's identity and a veracity hearing should be required 
when, first, the probable cause portion of the complaint for search war-
rant is supported either entirely or primarily by an undisclosed inform-
ant; or, second, when the defendant puts the officer's veracity in issue to 
the satisfaction of the judge ruling on the motion for a veracity hearing. 
The prosecution may in such an instance avoid the in camera disclosure 
of the informant by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the challenge to the officer's veracity is unfounded. 
The spirit of Franks extends beyond its facts. Lower courts cannot 
require veracity hearings when the police officer acts on his own first 
hand knowledge and not when he relies upon an informant. Such a 
frivolous distinction would be an open invitation to enforcement offi-
cials to fabricate statements and even to create nonexistent informants, 
thus easily circumventing the possibility of a veracity hearing. The 
availability of such a simple subterfuge would make the Franks ruling 
meaningless. Fran_ks logically requires a check on the affiant's veracity 
both when the affiant states his own beliefs and when he repeats the 
allegations of an informant. 
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